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EMPLOYMENT LAW
MATTHEW P. HOLT

I. INTRODUCTION
Although there were a number of employment law cases decided during
the abbreviated survey period, there were few, if any, changes or modifications in the law. A few cases clarify the application of existing law
or deal with areas likely to be seen again.
II. THE AT WILL DOCTRINE
A long-waged war in the field of employment concerns itself with the
"at will" doctrine.' Under this doctrine, an employer may terminate an
employment contract at his pleasure, without any cause or reason. Growing concern for employees' rights have created many exceptions to the
rule, and employment contracts often protect against such an occurrence.'
Notwithstanding exceptions to the rule and contractural devices to protect
against its harm, a number of challenges have been raised by its opponents. Some would prefer that an implied contract be read into every
employment agreement, thereby allowing an employer to discharge an
employee only in good faith.'
The criticism of the "at will" doctrine was most recently addressed by
the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Bottijliso v. Hutchison FruitCompany.4 The court rejected plaintiff's plea to abolish the "at will" doctrine
and affirmed the employer's right to control his own business. 5 Although
criticized as failing to accord employees needed protection from capricious employers,6 Bottijliso stands as the final word on the subject. It
has, no doubt, served to deter a barrage of would-be litigants who have
been discharged by their employers without reason.
The recent case of Danzer v. Professional Insurors, Inc.,7 may cast
1. See Isbell-Sirotkin, Defending the Abusively Discharged Employee: In Search of a Judicial
Solution, 12 N.M.L. Rev. 711 (1982).
2. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Stratton, 94 N.M. 665, 615 P.2d 982 (1980) (prohibiting discharge of an
employee due to the exercise of constitutionally protected rights); N.L.R.B. v. Standard Oil Products
Co., 224 F.2d 465 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 902 (1955) (prohibiting discharges in violation
of the National Labor Relations Act).
3. Isbell-Sirotkin, supra note 1, at 716.
4. 96 N.M. 789, 635 P.2d 992 (Ct. App. 1981).
5. Id. at 74, 635 P.2d at 997.
6. Isbell-Sirotkin, supra note 1, at 734-35.
7. 101 N.M. 178, 679 P.2d 1276 (1984).
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doubt on the continued viability of Bottijliso and will probably result in
litigation so as to resolve the seeming inconsistencies between the two.
It should be noted at the outset that the holding in Danzer is perfectly
harmonious with Bottijliso; it is solely the dicta of Danzer that raises
question.
Danzer entered into a contract with Professional Insurors whereby
Danzer agreed to solicit business for and sell insurance on behalf of
Professional Insurors.8 He was to receive a modest annual salary plus a
percentage of all insurance sold. The written employment agreement did
not require that good cause exist as a precondition to terminating the
agreement. 9 It did provide, however, that if Professional Insurors terminated the agreement without good cause, Danzer was entitled to compensation for thirty days after the termination and, further, that Danzer
would not be bound by a non-compete clause."0
Danzer's contract was terminated, in his opinion, without cause, and
he sued to recover the thirty days of compensation. " Professional Insurors
counterclaimed to enforce the non-competition clause.' 2 The trial court
found for Danzer and entered judgment accordingly.
The holding in Danzer is perfectly consistent with Bottijliso because
of the supreme court's language in affirming the trial court. The court
quoted from Bottijliso to define good cause: "The Court of Appeals has
stited that 'an employer may discharge an employee where he is dissatisfied in good faith with services of the employee and the contract does
not otherwise restrict grounds of discharge.',,'. The quote is, of course,
accurate. The supreme court, however, did not include the prefaced language in Bottijliso: "Even under a contract for a definite term, . . .
It is likely that the qualifier was deleted because Danzer involved a
contract for a definite term, whereas Bottijliso did not. Unless a practitioner relying on Danzer considers Bottijliso, however, he could reasonably believe that Bottijliso requires that an employer may discharge only
in good faith and without regard to whether the contract was for a definite
term.
The confusion is exacerbated by the court's reliance on Comfort &
Fleming Insurance Brokers, Inc. v. Hoxsey, 1"a Washington Court of
8. Id. at 180-81, 679 P.2d at 1278-79.
9. Id. at 182, 679 P.2d at 1280.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 180, 679 P.2d at 1278.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 182, 679 P.2d at 1280 (quoting Botijliso, 96 N.M. at 791, 635 P.2d at 994).
14. 96 N.M. at 791, 635 P.2d at 994.
15. 26 Wash. App. 172, 613 P.2d 138 (1980).
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Appeals decision. Without discussion of the facts in Comfort, the Danzer
court quoted from it at length:
Termination for good cause shown is a restriction on the employer's
right to discharge an employee at will. Such a provision is an employment condition guaranteeing . . . against the whim or caprice
of an employer allowing discharge only for legal cause, i.e., some
causes inherent in and related to the qualifications of the employee
or a failure to properly perform some essential aspect of the employee's job function.' 6
The plain language of Comfort provides that an "at will" employee can
be discharged only for cause. 7 Read in conjunction with the partial quote
from Bottijliso, the unwary lawyer easily could be led to believe the "at
will" doctrine has been abrograted.
It is possible that the court in Danzer did intend to substantially change
the law. It is more likely, however, that the language the court chose to
quote was simply taken for its value to the present case, without regard
to its potential ramifications. 8
The confusion generated by Danzer will have to be clarified by further
appellate decisions. Meanwhile, employees could reasonably argue that
the ruling in Bottijliso is no longer the law and employers can terminate
an "at will" employee only in good faith.
II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Even where an employer's rights to terminate an employment contract
are clearly defined, he is often subject to compliance with a strict set of
procedures in terminating employment. These procedures, because they
set forth an employee's express or implied rights under a contract, hereafter are referred to as contractual due process. When an employer is a
governmental entity, he must, in some circumstances, further afford the
employee constitutional due process. Several decided cases touched upon
these obligations.
In Vigil v. Arzola, 9 the claimant's employment contract was terminated.
16. 101 N.M. at 182-83, 679 P.2d at 1280-81 (quoting Comfort, 26 Wash. App. at 177, 613
P.2d at 141).
17. 26 Wash. App. at 177, 613 P.2d at 141. It should be noted that the decision in Comfort dealt
with virtually identical facts to those in Danzer: The employee was bound by a non-competition
clause only if discharged with good cause, but was otherwise an "at will" employee. The courts
sweeping language concerning good cause in "at will" employment situations was obviously unintended dicta, as other cases in Washington have firmly rejected any challenge to the "at will"
doctrine.
18. See Webster v. Schauble, 65 Wash. 2d 849, 400 P.2d 292 (1965); Parker v. United Airlines,
Inc., 32 Wash. App. 722, 649 P.2d 181 (1982).
19. 101 N.M. 687, 687 P.2d 1035 (1984).
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Vigil brought suit alleging that he was fired without being accorded
contractual due process. 2 ° The trial court dismissed his claim for failure
to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. 2 '
The supreme court reversed, concluding that if the allegations were
true, the claimant was entitled to relief.22 Two dissenters argued that the
trial court properly dismissed the claim, noting that Vigil was a probationary employee. 23 Relying on Forrester v. Parker,24 the dissent concluded that only non-probationary employees are entitled to contractual
due process and criticized the majority opinion for extending the holding
of Forresterto encompass probationary employees. 25
Both positions are well taken. A problem with the decision stems from
the trial court's resolution of the matter on a legal, rather than evidentiary,
basis. The dismissal for failure to state a cause of action required the
appellate court to accept all facts pled as true. The evidence, however,
belied one of the "facts" pled: Vigil, as a probationary employee, was
not entitled to contractual due process.26
It is unlikely, as the dissenters allege,27 that the majority meant to
extend the holding of Forrester. Instead, the majority's decision was
probably based on the trial court's unfortunate language in dismissing
the action. The confusion could have been avoided had the trial court
simply dismissed the action for failure to establish a prima facie case.
Another decision during the survey period dealt with an employee's
procedural rights arising out of the New Mexico Constitution and New
Mexico statutes. In Redman v. BoardofRegents of the New Mexico School
28 a teacher was fired for allegedly sending
for the Visually Handicapped,
an anonymous letter accusing school officials of misconduct.29 The firing
followed an investigation and a hearing. Redman contested the firing,
arguing that the hearing was not timely held.3"
The school was required by law to conduct its hearing within sixty
days of the time Redman objected to the proposed termination of her
contract. 3 ' Due to delays caused by the school's investigation, the hearing
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 688, 687 P.2d at 1039.
Id.
Id. at 688, 687 P.2d at 1039.
Id. at 688, 687 P.2d at 1039.
93 N.M. 781, 606 P.2d 191 (1980).
101 N.M. at 688, 687 P.2d at 1039.
Id.
Id.
102 N.M. 234, 693 P.2d 1266 (Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 236, 693 P.2d at 1268.
Id.at 236, 238, 693 P.2d at 1268, 1270.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-10-20(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
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was not timely held. 2 The court of appeals found that this violated
process rights, and reversed the school board's decision
Redman's due
3
to fire her.

Redman serves as a reminder to the practitioner that an employee's
rights will be enforced and that an employer, public or private, must
stand ready to ensure those rights. An employer, who is required either
by contractual or statutory obligation to prove his allegations of employee
misconduct within a specified period of time, is well advised to have
adequate documentation before he terminates an employee for misconduct. This not only ensures the employer of his right to discharge, but
also protects innocent employees from unfounded allegations by their
employers.

32. 102 N.M. at 236, 693 P.2d at 1268.
33. Id. at 240, 693 P.2d at 1272.

